Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submitlogin

I used to do Accounts Payable for a large tech company. Any invoice >$5,000 had to be matched to a PO. POs had to be approved by an appropriate level. Payment information was maintained by a separate team and POs were linked to that payee. Nearly all payments were done via ACH; we actively discouraged wire transfers wherever possible by charging ridiculous fees. The payment process itself was also audited daily by the payments team. We also had an entire org of finance people responsible for controllership. This fraud would have been hard, though not impossible to pull off in this system.


Sounds like a lot of sv companies don't have the internal oversight /internal security taken for granted by older companies.

Given this story I would bet there is a fair bit of undiscovered internal fraud at google and fb


In a former life I worked with a large procure-to-pay ERP system, and we were even stricter.

Vendors had to be pre-approved and their bank details managed, who were explicitly matched to POs, explicitly matched to invoices, and finally... invoices had to be matched to inventory receipts before any sort of payment was triggered. POs had to be approved by someone internally with specific approval levels as well.

Not sure if we were insanely overboard but... no idea how this happened.


I wrote an application that's primary function is reclamation of unclaimed AP credits / duplicate payments. You might be surprised by how much space there is for better controls here in large (Fortune 500) companies.


Same, I did accounts for a government department once.

But it is amazing how bad some private companies accounts are. We ended up effectively advising them on their accounts receivable.

The thing about this particular scam is the size; no-one goes hunting for POs and invoices for $100m. (or everyone assumes someone else has). It's the success of the big lie.


I hope someone writes a book or they make this one into a movie. It would be awesome if the scammers had an account name using a very similar name or a unicode hack. Too bad they didn't have a better getaway plan.


Note to self: when fishing, send multiple invoices of $4000.


Also look out after any publicized fundraising. The phishing attacks begin with similar things where people impersonated the CEO to the head of finance pretty much a few months after fundraising. They know the small companies don't have the same sized finance & legal teams.


Public key cryptography of any sort would also probably help here. PGP keys on their website, Facebook page, annual report?

Blockchain?


Blockchain would be WORSE because you have much less of a shot at reversing and recovering the fraudulent transactions.


True, but can't you still trace the transactions as they are processed or converted into real cash?


Bitcoin tumblers obfuscate the trail


Tumbling $100 million seems slightly painful.


Blockchain doesn't seem like the most appropriate solution here because what you really care about is basically document signing. The ledger can be maintained by a central authority (accounts payable).


If a vendor sent their bank details via a signed message in the block chain then a change of bank details could be arranged by sending a new signed message from the same address with the new details. Obviously it would need to be agreed in advance that this is the method of changing payment details, then the buyer can absolve responsibility to the vendor as it will require the vendor to maintain security of their private key.


A blockchain wouldn't improve the security of sending a signed message at all it just provides a shared storage of the message.




Consider applying for YC's Fall 2026 batch! Applications are open till July 27.

Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: