Right. There are infinite flawed arguments for every correct position. Just because one of them got mind share doesn't mean there are no other, good arguments. One would hope that correctness of an argument would have a strong correlation with its memetic success, but it doesn't seem so.
The way I parsed your comment: there are so many bad arguments possible even for good ideas that if you see people use a bad argument for their idea, it doesn't mean there isn't a good argument instead that can replace it. Then, you'd think good arguments would get accepted more universally than bad arguments, but probably not. Is it even in the same ballpark?
I like the idea of seeking out good arguments in favour of other people's ideas, but I dislike the way it contradicts the principle that one has a responsibility to state good arguments for one's own position. Stating poor arguments for an idea should be grounds for not accepting that idea, which is why I thought what you said wasn't compatible with what I said. One reason I thought the bad heuristic was so bad is it didn't even reach the stage of assessing arguments properly, on actual merits, thus leaving the door wide open to myside bias, and to all the other biases too.
You know, it might be just my experience. Sometimes, it is like a game people play, where they present an incoherent argument for an idea they believe in, and then say "well, there could be a better argument, why don't you look for it?". That's something your comment reminded me of, even if it went in the direction of agreeing with consensus.
The fact that there might be good arguments for a proposition doesn't mean I'm responsible for looking for them. There's an abstract sense in which I should be seeking all good arguments for everything, but the world is big and my resources limited and even if all I'm doing is rationally seeking truth I need to prioritize. And in a rhetorical context, there are certainly burden-of-proof considerations.
My point was simply that a flawed argument for "X" should not lead me to think "not X" is more likely. Otherwise, I can get you to think any "Y" by presenting flawed arguments that "not Y" - I have an infinite supply of them regardless of whether "Y" or "not Y" in fact.
Yeah, there is separately the principle of charity, where if I understand an argument to be flawed, I should look for similar correct arguments and check if that's what the other party meant. In some contexts (here, for instance) that's appropriate and even important. But it's not quite the same notion.
